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Drought
Donald A. Wilhite

Drought is a normal feature of climate. Although
scientists disagree on what constitutes a drought
(Wilhite and Glantz, 1985: 111), it represents a
common experience that, in a sense, binds certain
regions together (e.g., the Great Plains). During the
past century, the united states has been plagued by
numerous major drought episodes (e.g., 1890s, 1930s)
and innumerable dry spells. In fact, it is unusual for
drought not to occur somewhere in the united states
each year. Recent short-term droughts that have
resulted in sUbstantial damage include the drought and
heat wave of 1980 in the southwestern, southern, and
central plains, and southern Corn Belt states; the
1983 drought in the Corn Belt; the 1985 drought in the
northern and central Great Plains and the Northeast;
the 1986 drought in the Southeast; and the 1988
drought in the Corn Belt and northern Great Plains
states.
Although severe drought generally occurs more
frequently in some parts of the united States than
others, no part of the nation is immune (Karl and
Knight, 1985). Severe drought is generally associated
with cumulative moisture deficiencies of sufficient
magnitude that, when extended over a sUbstantial
length of time, result in far-reaching impacts over a
rather large geographical area. For example, the
drought of July and August 1983 was so severe that the
federal
government designated 1,123
counties
in
twenty-two states as drought disaster areas.
In
addi tion to the designations that were made in the
Great Plains states of Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico,
and Texas, the federal government also declared parts
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of
Alabama,
Georgia,
Virginia,
west
Virginia,
Tennessee, Kentucky, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
parts of most Midwest states eligible for low-interest
disaster loans because of drought.
The
actions
of
the
federal
government
in
responding to the 1983 drought are not unique. In
fact, these actions seem almost inconsequential when
compared to the massive drought relief programs
formulated in response to the major episodes of severe
drought that have occurred in the united states during
the twentieth century.
For example,
during the
droughts of the mid-1970s the federal government was
responsible for the largest drought relief program in
u.s. history. The General Accounting Office (1979: 29)
calculated the cost of the drought program to four
federal agencies alone at more than $5 billion during
1976-77.
D.A. Wilhite and his colleagues
(1984)
estimated
expenditures
by
all
federal
agencies
involved in the response effort, plus administrative
costs at both the federal and state level, to be $8
billion from 1974 to 1977.
Since each drought relief effort in the united
states has relied, to some extent, on the precedents
set in previous episodes, it is not surprising that
mistakes and failures have been repeated. This chapter
documents and evaluates efforts to respond to drought
in 1976/77, the last major drought episode for which
large-scale federal relief efforts are documented.
Al though ten years have elapsed since this episode,
little has been done by the federal government to
prepare for, and thus respond more effectively to, the
inevitable recurrence of severe drought in the united
states. Considerably more progress has been made by
state governments. Recommendations are given on ways
to improve the effectiveness of federal and state
governments' response to future droughts. The concept
and advantages of drought planning and a ten-step
planning process will be discussed.
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT (1976/77)

That the federal government would attempt to mitigate
some of the most severe impacts of widespread drought
during the mid-1970s was not unexpected. Droughts of
greater intensity and duration during the 1930s and
1950s had produced similar responses. Although the
organizational structure for administering drought
relief and the forms of assistance available changed
significantly during the fifty years before the mid1970's drought, the fundamental approach did not.
During the mid-1970s,
the
Federal
Disaster
Assistance Administration (FDAA) was responsible for
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administering
grants
to
presidentially
declared
disaster areas from the president's disaster relief
fund. Moreover, FDAA was responsible for directing and
coordinating the assistance efforts of all federal
agencies (FDAA, 1975). The number of federal disaster
assistance programs available in 1975 was extensive.
Few, if any, of these programs had been designed
specifically to respond to problems caused by drought.
The actions of state and federal agencies that
resulted in response to the drought of 1976-1977 are
described in detail below. Table 9.1 provides a
chronology for these actions.
The 1976 Federal Drought Response

The first federal actions were initiated during the
last year of the Ford administration in response to
requests
from
Governor
Richard
F.
Kneip
and
Representative James Abdnor of South Dakota in July
1976. The governor requested federal agencies to
provide maximum assistance to the severely stricken
drought areas in his state (Kneip, 1976). This request
prompted the president to direct the Domestic Council
to review the socioeconomic impacts of drought in the
Dakotas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin and to determine if
additional assistance could be provided under existing
federal laws and programs (May, 1976). The governor's
letter was followed by a request from Representative
Abdnor to the secretary of agriculture for the
creation of a special task force to review and improve
current drought assistance programs (Abdnor, 1976). In
response to Abdnor's request, a special cabinet-level
drought committee was formed by the president in late
October.
The committee's objectives included the
development of a drought monitoring scheme and a
comprehensive plan and program for delivering shortterm assistance to drought-affected areas.
The
special
cabinet-level
drought
committee
reported to President Ford on December 28, 1976. By
this time, 325 counties had been declared emergency
disaster areas. Basically, the report provided a
summary of federal response to date, a status report
of the current situation, and an indication of problem
areas. The committee's findings suggested that current
programs IImay not be able to cope effectively if the
situation deteriorates much further" (Bell, 1976). The
report concluded that, IIwhen drought occurs it is
difficult to determine the nature and extent of
federal
assistance
required,
and
some
emergency
programs are not designed to cope with agricultural
drought. II
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Table 9.1
State and Federal Response to the 1976/1977 Drought

ActionlDate

Response/Date

1976
Request for action from South
Dakota governor and others--July

Domestic Council directed by President
Ford to review socioeconomic Impact-September

Request by Rep. Abdnor (South
Dakota) for tha creation of a
drought task force--July

President Ford appoints special cablnetlevel task force--October Task force
Issues report·-December

1977
States form regional alliances,
Western Governors' Task Force on
Regional Policy Management meets
to discuss drought conditions-January

Western States Water Council begins
10 monitor droughl·-January

Western governors meet with
Secretary Andrus--January

Commitments by federal and state
governmenls for Action; President ClIrlP.r
and governors arpolnt drought
coordinators--January to early March

Federal drought coordinator requests
drought-related Information from
13 federal agencles--February

Drought appraisal reporl prepared under
leadership of Ihe U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers for submission to President
Carter--mld-March

Presidential drought packaga for
$844 million submItted to Congress
--March 23

Droughl package passed almost Intacl by
Congress, except for two Items--Aprll to
early May

Formation of an Interagency Drought
Coordinating Committee to designate
Emergency Drought Impact Areas
under the president's drought
program--Aprll

2,145 counties declared Emergency Drough
Impact Areas by this committee between
April 25 and September 12

Drought conditions Improve between
April and August In tha Great Plains
and Upper Midwest states, and by
December In the Far West states

Federal drought assistance estimated
between $7 and 8 billion lor 1976/77

The drought committee's report reached President
Ford on January 3, 1977, seventeen days before the end
of his term in office. The committee's report provided
only a cursory examination of the drought problem and
did not deal with the questions of long-term policy
ci ted among the committee's original obj ecti ves. As
table 9.2 shows, the report included a tabulation
indicating
federal
assistance
in
presidentially
declared emergency areas up to December I, 1976.
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Federal
drought
response
during
the
Ford
administration
is
best
summarized
as
reactionoriented. Little if any planning was done to develop
alternative actions for possible future conditions. No
new programs were developed and no coordinated effort
was made to respond to deteriorating conditions.
The 1977 Federal Drought Response
In
January
1977,
regional
alliances
put
added
political pressure on Washington for action.
On
January 23, 1977, the Western Governors' Task Force on
Regional Policy Management met to discuss the scope
and magnitude of the western drought (WESTPO, 1978).
Following this meeting, the lead agency for water
policy and development, the Western states Water
Council (WSWC), began to monitor the drought situation
at regular intervals. The governors met with the
secretary of the interior, Cecil Andrus, to discuss
state needs and federal actions to mitigate the
societal impact of drought. Although many areas of the
nation were entering their second, and a few locations
their third, consecutive year of drought, this was the
first such joint discussion of mitigation alternatives
by state and federal officials.
The meeting with Secretary Andrus concluded with
several
commitments
by
the
secretary
and
the
governors.
The
secretary
agreed
to
seek
the
appointment of a federal drought coordinator and to
encourage the president to discuss the drought issue
at the National Governors Conference. The governors
also agreed to consider the need for alternative
approaches
to
cooperative,
multilateral
drought
response actions and to designate state drought
coordinators.
In
response to these initiatives,
President
Carter appointed Jack Watson to be federal drought
coordinator. One of Watson's first actions was to
request each of thirteen federal agencies to prepare a
report by March 3 (a lead time of less than one week)
that would include: (1) a brief evaluation of the
impacts and drought-related problems in each agency's
area of responsibility; (2) a list and description of
drought assistance programs;
(3)
a statement of
administration or funding problems; (4) an evaluation
of complaints from state and local governments and
drought victims; and (5) suggestions of legislative
changes or initiatives that might help to better
organize and deliver federal assistance in support of
state and local government efforts (Watson, 1977).
The agency reports submitted to Watson totaled
several thousand pages and were, not surprisingly,
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lacking
in
uniformity
and
consistency.
Watson
recognized the inability of his staff to restructure
the raw information provided by the agencies into a
format that would be useful in the decision-making
process (Kallaur, 1977). The u.s. Army Corps of
Engineers was asked to coordinate this assimilation
process. The Corps accepted this task and completed it
within one week, as directed. The thirteen reporting
agencies became known as the White House Drought study
Group. The Drought Appraisal Report, as it was called,
was completed on March 18 and served as the basis for
President Carter's drought program.
The Drought Appraisal Report described drought
conditions
in
the
united
states
and
addressed
questions
of
water
conservation,
water
supply
augmentation,
and
management
measures;
it
also
suggested possible immediate mitigating actions. The
report concentrated heavily on drought impacts in the
Far West, sometimes to the point of downplaying, if
not neglecting, those areas plagued by extreme drought
in the Midwest and northern plains states.
Federal response activities continued to expand
during March as drought conditions intensified and
encompassed larger geographic areas. Emergency loans
from FmHA were made available to 706 counties in
twenty-seven states. Livestock feed assistance was
provided in 436 counties in twelve states by ASCS. By
the end of March FDAA was providing aid to sixteen
states, by presidential declaration, through three
assistance programs (FDAA, 1977). The three programs
provided assistance for hay transportation, cattle
transportation,
and
emergency
feed.
USDA
was
responsible for coordinating most of the assistance
activities in the agricultural sector.
President Carter sent a request to Congress on
March 23 for $844 million in loans and grants for
farmers,
ranchers,
communities,
and
businesses
stricken by drought. The president's request for this
program was passed intact by Congress, except for the
Small
Business Administration
legislation and
a
reduction in funds, from $225 to $175 million, for the
Economic Development Agency (EDA)
loan and grant
program (Crawford, 1978: 143). The water bank bill was
signed by the president on April 7. Other portions of
the "package" were delayed until early May. Program
funds were to be expended or committed by September
30, 1977.

Table 9.2
Federal Grant and Loan Programs Providing Assistance in Disaster Areas
Through December 1, .1976
Agency/Program

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, DHUD
Hay and Cattie Transportation Assistance
Smail Business Administration
Economic Injury Disaster Loans
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, USDA
Disaster Payment Program
Emergency Uvestock Feed Program (now being phased
out due to lack of CCC-owned feed grain stocks)
Farmers Home Administration, USDA
Emergency Loans
Economic Development Administration, DOC
Economic Development-Special Economic Development
and Adiustment Assistance Prooram

Applications
Received

Estimated
Amount

Applications
Pavments

Amount
Paid

18,456

$83,312,926

9,701

$7,154,121"

31

$1,101,500

19

$701,500

151,869

$172,050,000

70,712

$65,497,000

N/A

$4,300,000

N/A

$4,300,000

7,300

$207,263,000

2,956

$133,263,000

22

Undetermined"

8

$1 556 000'

~: Bell, 1976.
'Partial payments on some applications
"Amount to be determined after further evaluation

~:

This summmary reflects applications for grants and loans received and funds requested therein following the presidential
emergency declarations and through November 1976 in the States of Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Eleven counties in Arkansas were declared eligible for assistance on December 3, 1976. The data contained
herein was limited to assistance provided in the areas covered by the presidential emergency declarations due to drought.
The assistance included in this report was provided through emergency and regular program authorities.
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In April the Interagency Drought Coordinating
Committee (IDCC) was created. The major function of
IDCC was to designate areas eligible for federal
assistance. This federal assistance, however, referred
only to programs authorized in President Carter's
"drought
package."
Members
of
IDec
included
representatives of the u.s. Department of Agriculture
(chairman), the Small Business Administration and the
Departments of Interior and Commerce. Geographic areas
designated by IDCC were referred to as Emergency
Drought Impact Areas (EDIAs).
During the first formal meeting of IDCC, held on
April 25, 1977, the committee designated 1183 counties
as EDIAs.
Of these,
842
had already
received
presidential or secretarial declarations (Stockton,
1977) .
The EDIAs were located in 24 western and
midwestern states. The list of declarations grew
during the summer months. By September 12, 1977, the
date of the last declaration, 2,145 counties (70
percent of all counties in the united States) were
included as EDIAs. These designations were to expire
on September 30.
In the early stages of IDCC there were no
distinct criteria for the designation of EDIAs. At
least half of the counties designated during this time
period
were
so
designated
with
no
supporting
documentation.
The
need
for
such
criteria was
discussed during the third meeting of IDCC on May 3.
It was agreed that ASCS would draft a list of
criteria, which was presented to and approved by the
committee on May 20. The list included the Palmer
Drought
Severity
Index
(PDSI) .
This
index was
apparently the principal criterion used by IDCC to
determine eligibility for drought assistance (General
Accounting Office, 1979: 29).
Considerable confusion appears to have developed
over IDCC designations.
Many federal
and state
officials assumed that counties were automatically
eligible for all federal programs after they had been
designated by IDCC. Although it is not so specified in
the
original
memorandum
of
agreement,
IDCC
designations were intended to apply only to programs
included
in
the
presidential
drought
package.
Following IDCC designation, counties automatically
became eligible for only one of the many drought
package programs, FmHA' s Emergency Loan Program. To
qualify for other programs in the package, counties
had to meet the special eligibility requirements of
each program. Eligibility for programs not included in
the presidential drought package was determined on a
program-by-program basis and was not linked to IDCC
designations.
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The only distinction between IDCC-designated and
non-IDCC counties was that the former had access to
the
special
drought
funds
associated wi th
the
president's drought package. IDCC designations were
sweeping, usually focusing on states rather than
individual
counties.
The
detailed,
county-level
evaluation process was left to the several involved
federal agencies.
Although the presidential drought package was
sUbstantial ($844 million)--one of the largest single
appropriations for drought relief in the nation's
history--it represented only a small portion of the
total
federal
drought assistance program.
Forty
programs were available to provide assistance to the
private sector during 1976/77. However, six programs
accounted for the vast maj ori ty of funds disbursed:
(1) the Farmers' Home Administration's Emergency Loan
Program;
(2)
the Small Business Administration's
Disaster
Loan
Program;
(3)
the
Department
of
Commerce's Community Emergency Drought Relief Program;
(4)
the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency Fund
Program; (5) the Bureau of Reclamation's Emergency
Drought
Program;
and
(6)
the
Farmers'
Home
Administration's Community Program Loans and Grants.
The authorizations and activities associated with each
of these programs during the 1976/77 drought have been
summarized in a General Accounting Office report
(1979: 29) entitled "Federal Response to the 1976-77
Drought: What Should Be Done Next?" GAO reported that
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior
and SBA alone administered more than $5 billion in
drought relief programs to water users during 1976/77.
However, if the cost of programs administered by other
federal agencies is included, as well as the cost of
the relief programs of 1974 and drought-related
administration costs to states during 1974-77, the
total cost of the drought to the government can be
conservatively estimated at $7 to 8 billion (Wilhite
et aI., 1984).
IMPROVING FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT

In view of the experiences of the mid-1970s and
previous drought relief efforts,
certain lessons
emerge about ways to improve governmental response to
periods of widespread and severe drought. Based on the
foregoing information, four basic requirements for
more effective response by federal government are
suggested: (1) reliable and timely information and
dissemination plans; (2) objective and reliable impact
assessment procedures;
(3)
obj ecti ve and timely
designation procedures; and (4) appropriate disaster
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programs and efficient
delivery systems.

program

administration

and

Information Products and Dissemination Plans

The drought response efforts of the mid-1970s were not
based on adequate and systematic provision of timely
information on drought conditions and impacts to
persons
and
agencies
invol ved
in
administering
programs.
Although the availability of reliable,
current, and properly formated information does not
ensure correct and timely decisions on the part of
government officials, it is at least reasonable to
believe that good decisions are less likely to be made
on the basis of inadequate or incorrect information.
Many types of information are needed during
periods
of drought
if the wide-ranging
impacts
associated with water shortages are to be adequately
addressed.
For
example,
meteorological
data
is
necessary to describe the degree of water shortage and
to identify those geographical areas most affected.
Such data, in conjunction with information on soil
moisture conditions, can be used for early projections
of yield.
Commodity prices,
in conjunction with
projected yield figures, can be used to estimate
monetary losses for principal grain, vegetable, and
hay crops. Data on stream flow and ground water
depletion rates provide important information on the
outlook
for
water
supply
to
the
agricultural,
municipal, and industrial sectors.
A common requirement for all types of droughtrelated
information
is
that
it
be
reliable,
effectively organized, and timely. In almost all cases
during the mid-1970s' drought, government agencies did
not make assessments of the drought situation until
drought conditions had reached critical proportions.
To improve the ability of government to respond
effectively in times of drought, the drought situation
and
its
consequent
impacts must be continually
monitored. Since weather data form the basis for
virtually all other assessments, special attention
should be given to providing relevant observations of
precipitation and calculations of evapotranspiration
and soil moisture status.
Networks of automated
weather stations
(such as the one developed in
Nebraska, South Dakota, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, and
Iowa under partial support of the National Climate
Program Office) can provide the data needed for the
aforementioned calculations.
This network currently
provides near-real time data for seven meteorological
parameters--solar radiation, wind direction and speed,
precipitation,
humidity,
temperature,
and
soil
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temperature (Hubbard et al., 1983: 213; Hubbard, 1987:
97) .
Regional automated weather networks in droughtprone areas and terrestrial sensors in space can
provide the data base for drought early warning and
surveillance systems. Atmospheric scientists have a
significant contribution to make in the improved
collection and interpretation of weather data for
drought management.
Impact Assessment Procedures

A long-standing problem in responding to drought has
been the lack of reliable procedures for assessing
probable impact. Because drought normally has its most
immediate and sUbstantial impact on the agricultural
sector, improved techniques for assessing, in nearreal time, the impact of weather conditions on crops
and rangeland should greatly improve our ability to
identify (and therefore speed assistance to) areas
affected by drought.
Historically,
the
most
common
government
cri terion to identify areas stricken by drought has
been amount of normal precipitation. This information
and local reports of crop, pasture and livestock
conditions, and human distress were used extensively
during the 1930s and 1950s.
During 1976/77 POSI was used by federal agencies
and IOCC to establish eligibility of areas for drought
relief (General Accounting Office, 1979: 29). A map
showing the distribution of POSI values was (and is)
published regularly in the Weekly Weather and Crop
Bulletin. POSI is intended to describe long-term
moisture conditions. More recently, the Crop Moisture
Index
(CMI) ,
a
modification
of
POSI
and
more
agriculturally appropriate, has been used by federal
agencies to assess short-term moisture conditions
(Palmer, 1968: 157; National Weather Service, 1977).
CMI was not widely used during 1976/77.
POSI has been increasingly criticized in recent
years by scientists (Changnon, 1980: 5; Wilhite, 1983:
22; Alley, 1984: 22). Inconsistencies have been noted
between POSI and actual severity of the drought
impacts observed. There are several reasons for the
lack of agreement between calculated POSI values and
actual drought severity, particularly with respect to
agricultural drought.
Specific crop responses to
drought were not considered in the derivation of the
index, nor do they figure in the calculation of index
values. Yet, POSI is used, qualitatively, to assess
drought
impacts
on
crops.
Additionally,
the
Thornthwaite method
(Thornthwaite,
1948:
38)
of
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estimating evapotranspiration (ET) is used in the
calculation of PDSI values. The Thornthwaite method is
unable to account for sensible heat advection, a major
source of the energy that drives the ET process in the
Great Plains region. Thus, there is concern that the
Thornthwaite method severely underestimates ET in
subhumid and semiarid regions (Rosenberg et al., 1983)
and, accordingly, that the PDSI tends to overestimate
the amount of water remaining in the soil (Smith,
1983) .
Regional differences in land use and cropping
systems should be considered in the impact assessment
issue. For example, a PDSI of -3.0 in July may signal
substantial reduction in yield of nonirrigated corn
because of destruction of reproductive tissue. Were
moisture conditions to improve, corn yield would still
be low but soybeans, whose reproductive activity
continues through much of the growing season, may
produce near-normal yields.
Clearly, new techniques must be developed to
enhance our drought impact assessment capability.
Impacts are most precisely estimated on a cropspecific
basis.
Agricultural
meteorologists
and
agronomists, working together, have the skills needed
to develop crop-specific drought indices. Automated
weather data networks are now providing the data to
support the development and operation of these indices
in some drought-prone regions. These data can also
support numerous other assessment-related activities
of state government. Therefore, states should play an
important role in supporting the development and
maintenance of these networks.
Drought Designation Procedures

The development of objective and timely procedures to
determine eligibility for federal disaster assistance
is a necessary condition for the improvement of
government response to drought.
Although standby
legislation and response plans may reduce delays in
program formulation and implementation, the lack of
appropriate
designation
procedures
and
reliable,
objective criteria on which to base those designations
hampers the delivery of programs to the affected area
and leads to ineffective response.
Procedures for designating counties eligible for
assistance have changed with each drought episode.
During a particular episode, procedures may have been
al tered
in
response
to
deteriorating
weather
conditions. Changes in political administration in the
middle of a drought can also be expected to result in
changing designation procedures. During the mid-1970s'
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drought
the
procedure
for
designating
counties
eligible for disaster assistance was more complicated
and confusing than it had been in previous droughts,
partly because more agencies and committees were
invol ved in administering the programs (Wilhite et
al., 1984).
The General Accounting Office (1978: 95) has
summarized the sUbstantial differences in the disaster
declaration procedures used by major agencies--FmHA
and SBA--during 1977. The effect of these differences
in disaster declaration procedures was such that,
during the period July 1977 through January 1978, FmHA
and SBA operated their programs in forty-five and
fourteen states, respectively. Within states where
both agencies operated, certain counties were covered
by only one of the two agency programs.
One examination and evaluation of the function,
procedures, and actions of IDee has identified several
specific problem areas (Wilhite et al., 1984). First,
the existence and precise function of IDee were poorly
understood by government officials, especially at the
state level. In many cases, designations by the
committee were interpreted by government officials as
an automatic qualification of their state or county
for all federal disaster assistance programs. FmHA's
Emergency Loan Program was the only government program
actually enabled by IDee action.
Second,
IDee
designations
were
broad
and
sweeping, and impacts identified by states were not
verified by the committee on the basis of a common set
of objective data. No IDee evaluation criteria were
actually available until early June, and then they
were not widely understood. Of the 2145 counties
designated by IDee between April 25 and September 12,
1977, approximately 1575, or 73 percent, were approved
before the criteria had been properly defined.
Although entire states were often designated by IDee,
actual impact areas were of limited geographical
extent. For example, the primary impact area in
Nebraska in 1977, in terms of production losses of the
principal grain crops, was confined to a nine-county
area in the extreme southeastern corner of the state.
IDee
designated
the
entire
state
(ninety-three
counties) on April 25. These sweeping designations
provided many counties throughout the nation not
affected by the severe drought with access to FmHA
emergency loans. This action also led to the illusion
of a severe nationwide drought. Such an illusion can,
in the long run, be detrimental to the establishment
of drought relief programs.
Third, the criteria established by IDee were not
fully reliable for the purpose of identifying affected
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areas, although they were probably the best available
at the time. Assessments by federal agencies were
improvised from the data at hand. However, these
needed data were not available to the committee that
was
charged
with
evaluating
all
requests
for
assistance. Also, the data available to the committee
was, in some cases, out of date. Therefore, decisions
were, at times, based on information that may not have
represented the situation accurately.
Disaster Programs, Administration,
and Delivery systems

As many as forty separate programs were available to
provide assistance to drought victims in the form of
loans, grants, and insurance during the mid-1970s (see
table 9.3). These programs can be clustered into two
broad categories.
The
first
included
short-term
actions to avoid or lessen the impact of drought by
augmenting water supplies.
This was the primary
objective of President Carter's drought program. The
second group involved programs designed to make loans
to farmers to compensate them for production losses
and to provide them with working capital. The wide
range of assistance programs available reflects the
variety of groups and economic sectors affected by
drought and the lack of a coordinated federal disaster
response plan.
Two characteristics of these disaster programs
can be noted. First, only a few of the programs
available in the mid-1970s were designed to address
the specific problems associated with drought. Rather,
they were orginally formulated by Congress to respond
to problems of soil and water conservation and to
other natural disasters such as flooding. Second,
other than the on-going programs implemented in
response
to
previous
twentieth-century
drought
episodes (e. g., Great Plains Conservation Program),
the programs of the mid-1970s were intended to be
short-term or tactical. No new long-term program
initiatives were instituted during this period.
The
General
Accounting
Office
(1979:
29)
indicated four major problem areas in its study of the
programs and the administration of programs that were
part of the 1976/77 federal drought response effort.
First, several drought programs were enacted too late
to lessen the effects of drought.
For example,
President Carter's drought program did not receive
congressional approval until April and, in some cases,
May. In the Far West it had been apparent since
January 1977 that a water shortage would occur during
the irrigation season. As another example, delays in

Handbook of Emergency Management/162

congressional
approval
also
sharply
reduced
the
effectiveness of certain programs. For example, $75
million was authorized to the Bureau of Reclamation
for the Water Bank Program. However, only $4.8 million
was spent in this manner because most growers of
lower-value annual crops had already planted by the
time the program was implemented. It was too late to
reallocate water to the higher-value perennial crops.
Second, many projects that were approved violated
congressional intent to augment water supplies on a
short-term basis. Several projects were initiated so
late that water could not be supplied during the
drought for which the aid had been given. construction
of other projects did not even begin until after the
drought had ended. Also, drought loans and grants
appear to have been used to provide a low-cost source
of federal financing for nondrought-related projects.
Third, eligibility and repayment criteria for
emergency
drought
programs
were
inconsistent,
inequi table,
and
confusing.
Al though
sUbstantial
differences in criteria existed between many disaster
programs, the differences between the FmHA's Emergency
Loan Program and SBA's Disaster Loan Program are,
perhaps,
the most interesting because they were
directed to the same target groups. (For specific
differences between these two programs, see the 1978
GAO report). Loans obligated through the two programs
totaled $4.63 billion during 1976/77.
Fourth, inadequate coordination among agencies
led to program overlap and nonuniform standards for
determining eligible drought relief projects. GAO
cites several specific examples of loan applicants
applying to two agencies. In some cases, applications
were approved by both agencies, and applicants could
choose the loan with the most favorable terms.
The General Accounting Office (1979:29) concluded
its examination of the 1976/77
federal
drought
response effort with the recommendation that Congress
direct
the
four
primary
agencies
administering
assistance
programs
(USDA,
SBA,
Departments
of
Interior
and
Commerce)
to
assess
the
problems
encountered in providing emergency relief. Based on
the findings of this assessment, GAO recommended that
a national drought plan be developed to provide
assistance in a more timely, consistent, and equitable
manner. According to GAO, this plan should identify
the respective roles of agencies to avoid the overlap
and duplication that has been associated with previous
drought
response
efforts.
GAO
recommended
that
Congress consider legislation that would more clearly
define those roles. GAO also recommended standby
legislation (i.e., authorizing assistance programs) to
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permit
more
timely
response
to
drought-related
problems.
In light of past experiences, the recommendations
of GAO appear eminently sensible. The number of
agencies
participating
in
drought
assistance
activities during 1976/77, as well as the number of
programs available, indicates the obvious need for an
assessment and response plan organized under the
leadership of a single agency. In the process of
developing such a plan,
all disaster assistance
programs should be reviewed
in terms of their
consistency, efficiency, and equity, as well as their
relevance in dealing with the problems and impacts
associated with drought. Most assistance programs were
originally developed to address problems resulting
from the occurrence of natural hazards other than
drought or in response to specific water supply
problems. During droughts these programs have simply
been redirected. Also, more attention needs to be
given to alleviating drought impact and facilitating
recovery in the agricultural sector.
Multidisciplinary studies should be initiated to
define the impacts of past droughts. In addition,
scenarios should be used to help evaluate probable
impacts of future drought. The results of such studies
could aid in identifying real needs for drought
assistance programs,
reduce the number of
such
programs, and lead to improved efficiency in their
administration.
DROUGHT POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS
The Goals and Objectives of Drought policy

The underlying question in this discussion is: Should
government be involved in providing assistance to
those economic sectors or persons that experience
hardship
in
times
of
drought?
Because
of
the
frequency, severity, and spatial extent of drought,
governments in the united States and elsewhere have
elected to provide assistance through a wide range of
measures. These drought assistance measures are the
instruments of a de facto policy that has evolved over
the past fifty years. The decision on whether to
provide aid has been based more often on political
than economic reasoning. Thus, government involvement
in drought relief seems to be a political reality, and
one that should be dealt with in a more effective and
efficient manner.
Previous
discussion
has
concentrated
on
government response to a recent episode of widespread,
severe drought in the united states. This drought
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relief
effort
has
been
shown
to
be
largely
ineffective,
poorly
coordinated,
and
untimely.
Governments have reacted to, rather than prepared for,
recurrent and inevitable episodes of drought.
For purposes of contingency planning, the goals
of
government
drought
policy
must
be
stated
explicitly. without clearly stated drought policy
goals, contingency planning will lack direction and
purpose. Also, the effectiveness of drought assessment
and response actions will be difficult to evaluate.
Three goals for drought policy are proposed here.
First,
assistance measures should not discourage
agricultural producers,
municipalities,
and other
groups
from
adopting
appropriate
and
efficient
management practices to help alleviate the effects of
drought. Second, assistance should be provided in an
equitable, consistent, and predictable manner to all
without regard to economic circumstances, industry, or
geographic region. Third, the importance of protecting
the natural and agricultural resource base must be
recognized. Although these goals may not be achievable
in all cases, they do represent a model against which
recent drought policies and measures--the instruments
of that policy--can be evaluated. Drought policy goals
are also the foundation of any planning effort by
federal and state governments.
The specific objectives of drought policy will,
of course, vary between levels of government and from
country to country. In the united States, for example,
the objectives of a national drought policy might be:
1.

To prepare an organizational structure for
assessing and responding to drought-related
problems and water shortages

2.

To develop standby legislation that
adequately addresses the impacts of drought
through relevant assistance measures

3.

To encourage and support basic and applied
research leading to the development of
appropriate management strategies for all
drought-prone regions

4.

To foster and support water planning and
management activities at both the state and
regional level

To be successful, whether in the united States or
elsewhere, drought planning must be integrated within
the national and state--or provincial--levels of
government, involving existing regional (mul tistate)
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organizations as well as the private sector where
applicable. At the national level in the united
states, however, the diversity of impacts associated
wi th drought and the multi tude of federal agencies
with
responsibility
for
drought
assessment
and
response make it difficult for a single federal agency
to assume leadership in the development of a national
drought assessment and response plan. The development
of a national policy requires an interagency approach
in these instances, under the leadership of a single
agency. For this as well as other reasons, such as
unique local water management problems, wilhi te and
his colleagues (1986: 22) have suggested that where a
complex federal bureaucratic structure exists, as it
does in the united states, drought planning efforts
may be most effective if first initiated at the state
level. In other settings, such as in less-developed
countries,
the drought planning process may be
coordinated more easily at the national level since
the bureaucratic structure may be less formidable.
The objectives of drought policy at the state
level will differ from those at the national level,
reflecting
the
unique
physical,
environmental,
socioeconomic, and political characteristics of a
particular
area.
For
example,
drought
policy
objectives might be:
1.

To develop a monitoring system that provides
early warning of impending drought
conditions and impacts

2.

To develop an organizational structure that
enhances drought preparedness and response
by linking levels of government

The development of the organizational
structure
referred to in the second objective will provide the
necessary integration with drought policies at the
national level and should ensure adequate coordination
between the two levels.
Regional actions should be directed toward
fulfilling at least three objectives:
1.

To improve data collection and dissemination
efforts between states

2.

To identify or establish a regional
organization to facilitate much of the
drought planning effort and to improve
coordination and cooperation within and
between levels of government
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3.

To develop a strategy whereby the designated
organization can focus federal attention on
drought-stricken areas so that they receive
appropriate assistance in a timely manner

Successful regional drought planning efforts have
three prerequisites. First, the governors of the
region in question must be convinced of the advantages
of risk versus crisis management.
This usually
requires an event or series of events (i.e., the
occurrence of a severe drought) to first capture their
attention. An intensive educational effort must then
be directed toward these decision makers. Second,
states must have the full cooperation of federal
agencies. Water planning and management is a complex
problem, one whose solution involves all levels of
government. Federal agencies can play a key role in
identifying and
implementing
solutions
to
these
problems. Third, drought planning should begin at the
state level and then progress to the regional and
national level. States that are cooperating in a
regional planning effort must first establish the
necessary institutional infrastructure within their
state. This action will facilitate the planning effort
at higher levels of government.
DROUGHT POLICY FEATURES

The principal features of drought policy are grouped
into three categories: organization, response, and
evaluation.
Organizational features are planning activities
that provide timely and reliable assessments, such as
a drought early warning system, and procedures for a
coordinated and efficient response, such as drought
declaration.
These
characteristics would
be
the
foundation of a national or state drought plan. Only a
few states in the United states have drought plans
(Wilhite and Wood, 1985: 21).
Response features refer to assistance measures
and associated administrative procedures that are in
place to assist individual citizens or businesses
experiencing economic and physical hardship because of
drought. Numerous assistance measures are available in
the united States, but few are intended specifically
for drought. An all-risk crop insurance program has
been evolving in the United states since 1939 (Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation, 1980), although the level
of participation by farmers is quite low.
Evaluation of organization procedures and drought
assistance measures in the postdrought recovery period
is the third category of drought policy features.
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Governments in some countries (e.g., Australia) have
been more conscientious in their evaluation of recent
drought response efforts. In the united States, the
government does not routinely evaluate the performance
of response-related procedures or drought assistance
measures.
An evaluation of the 1976/77 drought
response activities was made by the General Accounting
Office (1979: 29) at the request of the chairman of
the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural
Resources, the late Congressman Leo J. Ryan. Wilhite
and
his
colleagues
(1984)
evaluated
government
response
to
the
mid-1970s'
drought
under
the
sponsorship of the National Science Foundation. These
were the first systematic evaluations of federal
drought response efforts in the United states. Earlier
efforts were only documentations of federal,
and
possibly state or private, involvement in drought
relief,
avoiding
judgments
of
its
effectiveness
(Murphy, 1935; U.S. Executive Office of the President,
1959) .
DROUGHT PLANNING:

WHAT IS IT?

Drought planning can be defined as actions taken by
government, industry, individual citizens, and others
in advance of drought for the purpose of mitigating
some of its effects. Drought planning should include,
but is not limited to, the following activities:
1.

A monitoring/early warning system to provide
decision makers at all levels with
information about the onset, continuation,
and termination of drought conditions and
their severity

2.

Operational assessment programs to reliably
determine the likely impact of the drought
event

3.

An institutional structure for coordinating
government actions, including information
flow within and between levels of government
and drought declaration and revocation
criteria and procedures

4.

Appropriate drought assistance programs with
predetermined eligibility and implementation
criteria

5.

Financial resources to maintain operational
programs and to initiate research required
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to support drought assessment and response
activities
6.

Educational programs designed to promote the
adoption of appropriate drought mitigation
strategies among the various economic
sectors most affected by drought

As figure 9.1 illustrates, drought planning has
been described by D. A. Wilhite and W. Easterling
(1987) as a ten-step process. This process is intended
to be flexible so that it can be easily adapted to
many
sociopolitical
situations
and
levels
of
government. continuous evaluation and updating of the
procedures included within each step of the process
are recommended to ensure that the plan remains most
responsive to the needs of the region involved. This
process should be useful to governments desiring to
implement some level of drought contingency planning
activity.
FEDERAL AND STATE DROUGHT PLANNING:
CURRENT STATUS

Earlier in this chapter, four basic requirements were
suggested as necessary to improve the effectiveness of
federal drought response efforts: (1) reliable and
timely
information
and
dissemination plans;
(2)
obj ecti ve and reliable impact assessment procedures;
(3) obj ecti ve and timely designation procedures; and
(4)
appropriate disaster programs
and
efficient
program
administration
and
delivery
systems.
A
national drought plan has been suggested as the best
way to attain significant progress in each of these
four areas.
Although debate on the need for a national
drought plan continues,
no movement toward the
development of such a
plan has occurred.
Some
improvement in the delivery of reliable and timely
information to decision makers during the 1988 drought
can be noted. Much of the credit for this improvement
must be given to the leadership provided by the Joint
Agricul tural Weather Facility of the U. S. Department
of
Agriculture
and
the
National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric Administration. However, the actions of
government in responding to widespread and severe
drought remain uncoordinated because of the lack of an
organizational
structure
within
the
federal
government. Clearly, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) must play a major coordinating role in
this effort. It should also be recognized that the
speed with which the Congress passed the 1988 drought
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relief legislation can be attributed largely to an
election year spirit of cooperation among members of
Congress. If drought continues into 1989, impacts will
be even more pervasive, requiring more comprehensive
assistance programs. Such bipartisan actions should
not be expected in future droughts. A national drought
policy needs to be established that defines goals and
objectives of federal drought assessment and response
programs.

Figure 9.1
A Ten·Step Drought Planning Process

Appointment of
Drought Task Force
(STEP 1)
Statement of Purpose
and Objectives
(STEP 2)
Inventory of Natural and Human
Resources, Financial Constraints
(STEP 3)
Development of Drought Plan
(STEP 4)
Identification of Research Needs
and Institutional Gaps
(STEP 5)
Synthesis of Drought Management
Science and Policy
(STEP 6)
Identification of Response Options
(STEP 7)
Implementation of Drought Plan
(STEP 8)
Development of Educational
and Training Programs
(STEP 9)
Development of
System Evaluation Procedures
(STEP 10)
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state governments in the united states have
typically played a passive role in assessing and
responding to drought. This was certainly the case in
the mid-1970s and in earlier drought episodes as well.
In recent years, state governments across the nation
have made impressive strides in preparing for droughtrelated water shortages. For example, in 1982 only
three states had prepared formal drought plans-Colorado, South Dakota, and New York. At present,
about twelve states have plans and another ten states
are developing plans.
certainly,
the
widespread
occurrence of severe episodes of drought in the united
states over the past decade, and especially since 1985
in the Southeast and Far West, has demonstrated the
vulnerability of our society to drought impacts and
highlighted the importance of government actions as a
mitigation tool.
Today, a number of resources are available that
can help state governments prepare for the recurrence
of drought. First, states can learn from the planning
experiences of other states. The Colorado Drought Plan
is probably the most duplicated approach. Second, a
model drought plan developed by the Western States
Water Council in the fall of 1987 helped many Western
states hastily assemble some plan of action in 1988.
This model
is based on the Colorado plan but
incorporates ideas and elements from other plans.
Finally, the ten-step planning process referred to in
the previous section of this chapter provided some
focus and direction to a few states during 1988. This
ten-step process is now being expanded with funding
from the National Science Foundation to incorporate a
model drought plan that will be applicable to all
regions of the united states (Wilhite and Easterling,
1988). The availability of this model in the spring of
1989 should facilitate the development and revision of
plans in drought-prone areas.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. government often responds to drought through
crisis management. This was the case in the mid-1970s
as well as in previous episodes of widespread and
severe drought. In crisis management the time to act
is perceived by decision makers to be short. Reaction
to crisis often results in the implementation of
hastily prepared assessment and response procedures
that lead to ineffective, poorly coordinated, and
untimely response. If planning were initiated between
periods of drought, the opportunity would exist to
develop
an
organized
response
that
might
more
effectively address issues and specific problem areas.
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Also, the limited resources available to government to
mitigate the effects of drought might be allocated in
a more beneficial manner.
In 1979 the General Accounting Office recommended
the formulation of a national drought plan to provide
assistance in a more timely, consistent, and equitable
way to drought-affected areas (GAO, 1979: 29). GAO
proposed that this plan identify the respective roles
of agencies involved in drought response to avoid
overlap and duplication; the need for legislation to
more closely define these roles; and the need for
standby legislation to permit more timely response to
drought-related problems.
This chapter has identified four requirements for
effective response to drought by government. First,
reliable and timely information on drought conditions
and drought-related impacts must be developed and
properly assembled and disseminated. This requires
near-real
time
meteorological
data
on
which
informational products can be based. Second, impact
assessment techniques must be improved. In the case of
agriculture, usually the first economic sector to
experience the hardships of drought, new types of
analyses must be developed to provide decision makers
at all levels with the types of information necessary
to understand the severity of drought and its impacts
so that appropriate actions can be implemented in a
timely manner. Third, designation procedures must be
centralized under a single agency or committee with
complete authority to determine eligibility for all
assistance programs. Cri teria must be determined in
advance of drought,
well-publicized when drought
occurs, and applied in a consistent manner. Finally,
assistance programs must be developed in advance of
drought to avoid the delays in program formulation and
congressional approval that occurred in the mid-1970s.
These programs should be administered by a single
agency through the mechanism of an
interagency
committee composed of representatives from all federal
agencies with responsibility in drought assessment and
response. State and/or regional representatives should
be included in the membership of this committee.
Assistance programs must address the specific problems
associated with drought.
GAO's recommendation for a national drought plan
has considerable merit.
For such a plan to be
effective, however, states must take a more active
role in planning for drought. In the past, most states
have played a passive role, relying almost exclusively
on the federal government to rescue residents of the
drought area. Although federal government has, for
lack of an alternative, accepted this role, improving
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government response to drought requires a cooperative
effort. states must develop their own organizational
plans for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating
information on drought conditions. This information
should form the basis for more objective and timely
assessments of impact. Today, more than twenty states
have developed or are developing drought plans. Each
plan
is
unique,
reflecting
the
water
supply
characteristics
and
problems
of
the
state
and
potential impact areas. However, state plans should be
linked to a
national drought plan through the
interagency
committee(s)
with
responsibility
for
drought
designation
and
program
administration.
Because of the limited resources available to states,
they can be expected to provide only a minimal level
of financial assistance to drought disaster victims.
One unique aspect of the mid-1970s' drought was
the effectiveness of regional organizations of states
in focusing the attention of federal government on the
problem. The Western Region Drought Action Task Force,
the Western Governors' Policy Office, and the Western
states Water Council, working in concert, were able to
make
a
more
unified
representation
to
federal
officials.
This lesson should not be forgotten.
Regional organizations are sure to play an even more
important role in the future.
It is proposed that drought planning efforts be
ini tiated at various levels of government and that
these efforts be closely coordinated. A ten-step
planning process is proposed that is adaptable to each
level
of
government
and
should
facilitate
the
development of drought plans. Regional organizations,
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Ohio River
Basin
Commission,
and
the
Western
Governors
Association,
must be
included
in this planning
process.
Regional
organizations
should
consider
centralizing
their
monitoring
and
assessment
activities as one means of improving the efficiency
and accuracy of information flow to the federal
government
and,
by
so
doing,
increasing
their
influence on drought policy.
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